

A STRATEGY FOR DISARMAMENT

-- Seymour Melman --

INTRODUCTION

Seymour Melman has long been active as a critic of establishment policies in defense spending and funding. Some of the titles of his books include: Dynamic Factors in Industrial Productivity, 1956; Peace Race, 1961; Our Depleted Society, 1965; Pentagon Capitalism, 1970; The Permanent War Economy, 1974. I'm being selective. These are just some. The forthcoming book, to appear in September (May I speak of this?) to be published by Knopf is entitled Profits Without Production.

Professor Melman is Co-Chairman for SANE, the National Committee for Sane Nuclear Policy in the United States. His Co-Chairman of SANE is William Winnepesinger, the President of the International Machinists' Association which includes aerospace workers in the U.S. and elsewhere and much of his recent interaction (recent, that is to say, in the last decade or two) has been with labour unions in facing the facts that Pentagon capitalism does not produce jobs very efficiently.

If one were to establish a search committee for the person who knows most about how to turn around the war economy and make of it a peace economy, either globally or locally, a competent committee would have to come up with Seymour Melman as the unique, best qualified individual. Therefore, it's in some sense a deprivation to us that he has elected tonight not to talk about that but to talk to us instead about something else, about which I'm sure he knows just as much and about which we are eager to be instructed: a strategy for disarmament.

Professor Melman.

Unintended I am sure, President Reagan has given us valuable instruction during the last days concerning the arms' race. In his judgement, it cannot be won. That indeed is the main sensible inference from his address in which he admonishes the scientists of the US to devote themselves for the next 20 years to find a way to stop those missiles from actually arriving. If the arms' race could be won, really, if in the classic military sense it were possible to manufacture the offensive assault power and strike a first blow with the most that would destroy the

opponent — then surely that's the course of policy that would be advocated. Perhaps with greater intensity than before. After all, that's the course of policy that's been followed. There's much to be gained, I think, from understanding the arms' race as an attempt to exercise political power by military means — an effort which has led into frustration on all sides owing to the invention of nuclear weapons and their production in quantity because that yields a final limit on military power among many other limits — the final limit being the inability of anyone to discover how to destroy a person or a community more than once. Therefore, the ability to do that, as so to speak, in theoretical multiples, is deprived of fulfillment. That deprivation has* finally led to the understanding — the assumption of President Reagan's address of March 23, 1982 — that a way must therefore be found to try to destroy some of the incoming warheads. Alas, Mr. Reagan or whoever wrote the address, didn't go very far in the examination of the limits of military power, for had they done so — just asked a few additional questions, — they would have learned that nuclear warheads can be delivered by very many means, not just by intercontinental missiles. A suitcase

is quite adequate. And while it is possible to put them in place at speeds of thousands of miles an hour, it is also possible to put them in place very slowly.

Accordingly, this problem raised by Mr. Reagan, of how to intercept the warheads, is really a much more complicated problem than he made out. Perhaps he didn't wish to break all the news at once, because the further elaboration of limits of military power, like on diversity of delivery systems, diversity of delivery containers and the like, would have surely raised some question about the appropriateness of military budgets approaching the three hundred billion dollar a year mark. That is, if they're not to be used as shield against nuclear warheads, fast moving or slow moving, then what is the rest of the budget for? Then of course there would be a great illumination. Then the remaining issue would be what the President referred to several times as the protection of our vital interests. That would have to be illuminated and that would quickly enough translate into the construction of military forces for waging wars of intervention at places of choice around the world. A procession of Viet Nam wars is not exactly a program to win elections in the United States — so elaboration on that theme had to be foregone — and was. Instead, the President left with an admonition to prepare some sort of Buck Rogers or Star Wars type weaponry. No definition given. No specification. No timetable. Not even the statement that it sure enough can be done. There was no promise of that sort whatever. There was enough, however, suggestion that the Russians have been trying hard, just as the Americans have, to build a major military force and that one had better watch out. How one watches but was left undetailed.

I am very interested in the arms' race and indeed I came to these subjects — at least in the post World War II period out of an inquiry on the subject of inspection for disarmament.

That is the title of the book that I did in 1958, and the book was a report of the inquiry that I was responsible for and a considerable team of engineers, scientists and others worked together to answer the question: Can a workable method be found for assuring that there would be no easy way to violate an international disarmament treaty if one were to be signed. It was understood at that time that if ways were to be found, if ways were available, that that was the last remaining barrier to obtaining international signatures to a disarmament treaty. In the framework of that understanding, I couldn't find it possible to continue the work I was doing on topics of industrial productivity and the like. I packed up the files, labeled the folders neatly, put them away in storage containers and went to work on the inspection problem. I think we produced a fine result and that book from Columbia University Press really shows the way, to the present day, with respect to the main problems, principle techniques to be used. I'll come back to that because my judgement is that 25 years later that's a very modern book.

My estimate is that the arms' race now has to be addressed again in a very fundamental way and that the publics in many countries are ready to do it for two reasons: 1) It is widely appreciated that under worst case conditions the arms' race cannot be won and really portends the prospect not just of great destructiveness, but indeed contains the prospect of the termination of human community — not simply as we have known it — the termination of human community. We were given a very important statement along these lines by the report of the US National Academy of Sciences in 1975 and titled Long Term World Wide Effects of Multiple Detonations of Nuclear Weapons. That report, that was explicated in the press, was not explicated with sufficient exactness to suit the Chairman of the Academy at that time, Dr. Philip Handler, so he undertook to write a piece which of course he thought the reporter should have written, but didn't. This appeared in the New York Times of November 26, 1975, with the title No Escape. The operative statements of this short article are the following. There would of course be the usual known effects from the detonation of nuclear weapons: radiation, blast, fire and the like. But then, Handler went on to say further that the depletion of stratospheric ozone resulting from multiple detonations would be global in scope, the affects in the southern hemisphere perhaps a third to a half that in the northern hemisphere and would persist for years, resulting in such intense ultraviolet irradiation of the earth's surface as to cause crop failure by direct damage to plants and cause major alterations of climate and to induce intense sunburn in a few minutes and to markedly increase the incidence of skin cancer in those exposed. The same global effect would be achieved if one superpower were to use all its weapons or if both were to use half, or Indeed if many lesser powers were to release an equivalent megatonnage scattered widely over the earth's surface. It wouldn't matter where in the northern hemisphere the nitrogen oxides formed in the explosion were inserted in the stratosphere, the global effect would be the same. And further, he wrote, in addition to the uncertain remaining retaliatory

capability of the target country, no nation can deliver what is intended as a massive pre-emptive strike without automatic catastrophic natural consequences to itself. In other words, the backlash effect is automatic and certain and it is no longer militarily, technically conceivable to carry out a perfectly competent first strike, destroying the entire military force of an opponent and remain intact and be able to profit from it politically. Finally, Handler wrote, nor may any nation anywhere assume that it could somehow be beneficiary of a large scale nuclear exchange between two other powers and itself escape unscathed. With that, Handler was serving notice on the handful of Maoists, wherever they may be, that triggering nuclear war between the super powers is no way to survive and be the winner of some sort of intact globe.

As against that worst case, it's important to see the arms' race under best case terms, that is, no nuclear war — merely a continuance of the arms' race. A continuance and further escalation of enormous expenditures of money, technical talent, productive brains and hands and raw materials without stint. In that case we could expect a continuation of inflation together with unemployment together with industrial decay in the principal industrial countries of the world involved in the arms' race. And so it is the fact that the places that are the concentration of arms' race activity, the places with the greatest amount of military technical research, the countries with the largest expenditure of effort of every sort in military technologies are also the locations of industrial decay, of incompetence, of factories that can't produce competent goods, of lower rates of productivity growth, of infra structures that show the sign at hand of neglect of material decay, In order to live a community must produce so when that competence is frustrated by allocation of vital production resources to the arms race then a fundamental quality of community life is disrupted. Furthermore, it is the fundamental task of an economy to organize people to do useful work and the normal functioning of a war economy frustrates that capability. It is visible in elaborate detail in that land mass south of your border and the diagnosis of that process has now been carried out in sufficient elaboration in numbers of books.

I'd like to appeal to an old fashioned idea here, namely, the part of the appreciation of the validity of statements and their predictive power, their ability to explain events — past events, present events, future events. By that test, I make bold to commend to your attention the books that I have done called The Peace Race, Our Depleted Society, Pentagon Capitalism, The Permanent War Economy and see whether the analysis given there meet the test of predictive power; and see the contrast between the analysis of the operating characteristics of military economy given there as against the analysis that is to be found in any textbook in Economics where the characteristic treatment is to render military economy invisible on the grounds that it is not different from anything else, on the grounds that it merely buys and sells things with

money value. Since buying and selling with money value is what is done with every other enterprise, then this is no different from any other enterprise. As against that proposition and its total failure to predict, to explain events in the industrial economy of the United States and other countries, see the consequences that flow from the understanding that the military industrial enterprise produces commodities that have money value but that have the unique property of not being serviceable either for consumption or for further production. That in consequence has the effect of exiting in fact even from the market exchange phenomena to which the textbooks of Economics are so devoted.

Under the best case analysis, therefore, of the arms' race, what is portended is economy of decay, of incompetence, of inability to organize useful work, of inability to apply the greater command of the knowledge of nature — to useful work by man. That inability is accounted for by the analysis of military economy and is not accounted for by the analysis of economy as simply a system of money in exchange. I therefore want to call your attention to the prospects for reversing the arms' race and I do so on the confident assumption that all of us would rather live than die and on the further understanding that while we each understand full well the limits of the human condition, we find it difficult to unbearable to contemplate the idea that not just we as individuals but indeed that entire community shall cease to exist. That's a contemplation that I think is enormously difficult, painful beyond bearing for any of us to deal with. So I appeal to your appreciation of these feelings to open your minds to a piece of history that until now has been essentially put into the memory hole Orwellian style. That history is what happened between the governments of the United States of America and the Soviet Union in the period 1961-62. In 1961, John F Kennedy appointed John J McCoy, then recently retired as the president of the Chase Bank in New York, as his principle disarmament advisor, Chairman of the Advisory Committee of the Arms Control Disarmament Agency. He dispatched McCoy to have conversations with Valerian Zorer, the Soviet delegate to the United Nations. They did that and the conversations were quite successful. That is to say, the two men reached an agreement written down in a few paragraphs, three typescript pages, subsequently published and adopted by unanimous resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The McCoy-Zorer agreement, as it's come to be known, was essentially an agreement to agree. It defined the agreed terms to which a reversal of the arms' race should comply. Given that agreement to agree, the government of the U S and the Soviet Union proceeded to formulate elaborate schemes for the reversal of the arms' race. The U S government published its proposal in April of 1962 and it bears the title (this is the document), Blueprint for the Peace Race It is subtitled, Outline of Basic Provision of a Treaty on General and. In a Peaceful World? It was introduced to the press on April 18, with a statement by President Kennedy. The scheme involves a three stage plan to be executed in ten years

involving a comprehensive reversal of arms race starting with the U S and the U S S R , reaching out to other countries. All military personnel, all armaments involved are all to be dealt with together with accompanying inspection and verification, all to be carried out to the accompaniment of a build up of international institutions to be able to do conflict settlement while military armed forces of the powers were being de-escalated over a decade long period. The Soviets produced their plan in September, 1962. During the same months the U S government proceeded to publish explications for the general public of its plan. This was called, Toward a World Without War, a summary of U S disarmament efforts, past and present. It is the sort of statement that would appear, say, in a Sunday supplement general circulation newspaper, with accompanying illustrations. The Arms Control Disarmament Agency proceeded to publish a set of addresses. John J McCoy and several colleagues went up and down the country, giving these peace and disarmament addresses to groups of bankers, chambers of commerce and public groups. And so, in a collection called Disarmament, The New U S Initiative, John J McCoy gave an address called Gall for Leadership; Adlai Stevenson, called Working Toward a World Without War; Dean Rusk on U S Outlines, Initial Proposals: A Program for General Complete Disarmament. Again by Rusk, U S Urges Soviet Union to Join In Ending Nuclear Weapons Tests. William Foster, The Initiative for Peace; Arthur H Dean, The New Search for Disarmament, 1962. These addresses are of a quality such that were they handed at the time to an organization like SANE and were I the Go-Chairman of that organization at that time I would of course propose prompt publication and be proud of these statements over and premature. I am trying to convey to you that the government of the United States, in that period 1961-62 took a series of serious steps and one of the most important indications of seriousness was the participation and activity of John McCoy. If you go back to the press of the time you will see him described as Mr. Establishment, the leading personality of the ruling class. So, when John McCloy went back and forth over the country, mobilizing the opinion of his contemporaries, that is to be understood as a serious effort.

The Soviets made their proposal in September of 1962 in a statement of about equal length, approximately thirty odd pages of printed text. But, these two proposals were never negotiated because in October, 1962 we experienced the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Kennedy White House emerged from that crisis with the estimate that they had learned how to play nuclear chicken and win that crisis with the evident understanding that they would never again permit themselves to be in the same position of dramatic military inferiority. Let it be understood that the Soviets possessed at that time 3 to 6 ICBMs, a few short range pilotless craft, like cruise missiles or the German V1 mounted on submarines, a fleet of aircraft capable of one-way rides to North America. The U.S. Armed Forces included 175 ICBMs, 600 B52 bombers, 600 B47 bombers, 100 B58 bombers, they being supersonic. So the United States possessed at

that time a military striking power fully competent to destroy in one blow the entire Soviet military system and surely the Soviet population industrial base. Why the Cuban Missile Crisis occurred is a matter of great importance, an issue that is characteristically omitted from discussion in the literature — but that opens up a set of collateral and interesting issues — which I will leave to another time. The important thing for this discussion is that following the Cuban Missile Crisis the idea of reversing the arms' race was buried, was taken off the public agenda, was made into a non-issue, a non-event. • ; .:

How was that done? First of all, the staff that had been engaged in the Arms' Control Disarmament Agency, the State Department, the White House on formulating, on addressing problems of how to reverse an arms' race, was gradually dismantled. Secondly, the universities essentially omitted such subject matter from the courses in political science and international affairs, such that by 1983 I find there are 159 courses in political science given at Columbia University and there is not a single one which addresses a formulation of problems that might be involved were one to attempt to formulate a reversal of an arms' race agreement. Further I have found that these courses characteristically do not even mention the fact that in 1961-62 there was a serious proposal and effort to formulate a reversal of the arms' race, and that there had been agreements in principle between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the McCloy-Zoeren agreements, on the importance of doing this and on the essential mode of operation to accomplish it. Further, from 1962 to the present day the private foundations in the U.S. that account for the bulk of research grants in international relations (Ford and Rockefeller account for 85% of them), have not granted funds with respect to reversal of arms' race studies. They have lavishly funded studies on strategic problems. They have given an abundance of money on how to regulate an arms' race, arms' control. They have not put ten cents into research on how to reverse an arms' race. The government of the U.S. has established the Hubert Humphrey Fellowships on disarmament and arms' control but all you will find is arms' control and that comes out with unmistakable clarity in the circular that is issued and the examples that are offered for research papers. No major publisher in the U.S. has published a single book by an American dealing with the reversal of the arms' race from 1962 to the present day. A collection of course outlines was prepared about 5 years ago on international relations topics in the United States. Courses purporting to deal with peace problems. I went through them page by page and paragraph by paragraph — a rather thick compilation. I found seven courses in which the word disarmament was mentioned in the syllabus, but in five of those it was just mentioned. There were no accompanying readings on the subject. All the readings were on the conduct of the arms' race and on regulating it. In only two cases were there any readings to be found addressing reversal of the arms' race. In a certain way, what is all the more remarkable in this is the fact that these documents that I have shown you for illustration are available in every library of a

university that is a government depository. The books are there. They are simply not known and not being read. Like the Pentagon papers of a later time they exist. They are merely not read, at all. In my judgement the time has come to learn a lesson from this history, to raise once again the issue of reversal of the arms' race and not to permit the victory that has been allowed to gather in the hands of the operators of the war system. The war party in the U.S. by which I mean the whole abrogation of persons and institutions who live by and for the conduct of the arms' race have in fact failed. That's what I meant by characterizing the President's address of March 23. I believe that in the U.S. alone, not to say in the publics of Western Europe, there is now an immense interest and concern in matters of war and peace. By the fall of 1982 there was a reported opposition to further growth in military budgets of a magnitude never seen since the time of the great hostility to the war in Viet Nam. Seventy-two percent of the public declaring themselves against further increases in military budgets. I trust that will give you a clue to the character and tone of the address that the President gave a day ago. It was a desperate effort to whip up once again the fear and the agreement to the further conducts of military budget's escalation.

A reversal of the arms' race, I assure you, is no child's play. It's a complicated matter and there is an array of problems that deserve serious address. What I find terrifying is that these problems have been going without address in the universities of the Western World. So, I would like to enumerate to you, even without discussing any of them in great detail, the nature of these problems and I do that in the estimate that it is the fundamental obligation of intellectuals not only to formulate basic knowledge about nature and society but also to formulate ideas about community policy, because in so doing and in explicating the consequences of alternative policy we make it more possible for all our fellows to contemplate matters of policy and be able to participate in intelligent judgement on these vital matters.

Here are some of the problems involved in the reversal of arms' race. How is one to categorize the weaponry and the variety of forces in modern armies? They are quite dissimilar. The U.S. has a lot of air craft carriers. The Soviets have maybe two, and they're smaller ones. The Soviets have a considerable quantity of armored vehicles. The U.S. has fewer such vehicles. How is one to classify the weaponry of the armed forces in order to expedite a gradual reduction? That is a major issue because it is necessary to carry out the reduction under conditions of a meaningful rate, that is to say, the reduction must be of a sort so that in a given time period the reversal actually occurs, but there is a collateral problem and that is the reduction must not take place either at such a rate or in such a manner as to excite great fear or causing a fundamental change in military position of one country vis-a-

vis the other. That's why, you see, these matters of how to categorize armed forces for the purpose of a reduction process is an important issue of reduction, a fundamental one. How does one cope with inventories; that is, enormous inventories of weapons already produced? How does one cope with the problem of production, whereby that I mean not only the scale of industrial economy is devoted to production but in fact important parts of that production takes place under condition of great secrecy. For example, there are military factories in various countries made known to me which are unknown to the populace of those countries. That is, their existence is not known. How does one, therefore, cope with the fact that in place in the ongoing military industry apparatus there is a major measure of secrecy that makes the starting problem of formulating an inventory of production capacity and an inventory of what has been produced a less than obvious matter. How is one to organize the conversion from military to civilian economy? There, I think, we are pretty well equipped. We have some useful ideas. The conversion idea was not a part of the 1962 proposals by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. I think it had something to do with the fact that the relative size of those military economies was small compared with what now exists. How is one to get other states, apart from the two superpowers, to agree? I raised this question of reversing arms' race with a member of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party a few years ago and in a few sentences I raised the question and his immediate response was, "What about China?", to which I responded, "I don't have a science in hand, with which to reply to that, but my judgement is that if the United States and the Soviet Union really wished such a course of policy, that I could not conceive that any Chinese government could in any durable way keep itself outside of such a framework and expect to be able to function reasonably, not to say prosper in a larger world. But I don't think that's a satisfactory answer to the question, "How does one get a great array of states, large, medium, small?" Consider the fact that nuclear weapons have become cheap, that they have become equalizers, readily available to small countries that can use their fearful power to threaten even large states. How does one carry out the inspection problem, that is, to insure compliance and know non-compliance with the disarmament treaty? How does one act to offset the effects of the major and influential pro-arms' race institutions that now operate in the major countries of the world and the minor countries? In the newly prospering countries of Africa, for example, one will find institutes of strategic studies modeled after their counterparts in the United States, in Canada, in England, in Germany, in France, in the U.S.S.R., all prepared with persons trained in these latter institutions and prepared to announce judgements about: "Why shouldn't India have nuclear weapons?" or "Why shouldn't Nigeria produce its own small arms?" or "Why shouldn't Egypt be in a position of not having to depend on the great powers?" or "Why shouldn't India see itself as a

proper autonomous nation? Is it not worthy of being able to care for its own security and not be simply dependent on the crumbs from the big power table?"

How is one to cope with the problems of war by accident that come from the limits of reliability of machines and the limits of reliability of people? Every year the U.S. Armed Forces report on the removal of a considerable number, by that I mean up to 3000 in a recent year, of persons from the nuclear weapons handling forces who are so removed for reason of aberrant behaviour or drug usage or the like. Well, I found it impressive that such a program functions and achieves this result. I am concerned about the fact of who they didn't find, and of the consequences that can emerge from aberrant behaviour with this class of material.

So, my judgement is that we have to address the problems of reversing the arms' race in a fresh manner. Consider this one aspect: the matter of inspection, of assuring in a workable way that there is no evasion of the disarmament treaty. See what has happened from 1958 to the present day. In 1958 our problem was to prevent illegal production of ICBMs and that was an interesting and an important problem, but it had a certain other worldly character. Why? Because there was no large stock of ICBMs in 1958. The making of ICBMs at that time was an idea mostly. A few had been made to put on the submarines. There was the beginning of the Minuteman program and that was about it in the U.S. But now there is an enormous inventory. In 1958 we talked about illegal production of warheads and diversion of fissionable material from various places. But in 1983, we now have a host of nuclear reactors and processing plants which are types of facilities that were not even contemplated in the work done in 1958. In 1958 we thought of conventional weapons as, well, pretty easy to handle for inspection purposes and we thought of them essentially as low power weaponry compared to the nuclears. By 1983 we know that there is an overlap in destructive capability between nuclear weapons, lower range of size and conventional weapons and we know that various types of conventional ordinance, for example, 155 millimeter cannon standard artillery pieces are now capable of firing nuclear tipped shells.

In 1958 we worried about the idea of secret organizations carrying out production, but in 1983 there has come to be an abundance of illegal type organizations, that is to say, large networks functioning in various underground fashions, some with, some without government sponsorship. In 1958 we contemplated the arms' race as something that a larger public would be ready to see turned around. It was rather fresh and rather new in the minds of the adult population. After all it had only been going since about 1948 — hence 12 years. But by 1983 a whole generation or two has emerged that has known nothing but the arms' race. So, there is a condition of taking it for granted that was never there before. That taking for granted includes the idea that one can live one's normal life and have normal expectations even with that going on

out there. So if you practice proper psychological denial you can make it. In 1958, of course there were institutions of an organized kind devoted to the concept of the arms' race, but they had nothing like the numbers the quantity of people, the budgets, the social status that is accorded to them in 1983. There was hardly a campus in 1958 where you couldn't find serious people who would be ready to talk about reversal of the arms' race. After a ll , only a few years after that, it took no great political courage to say that John J. McCloy may really have something in what he was saying. I mean to join with the Chief of the Establishment was no great act of political daring. But in 1983 to act for reversal of the arms' race means to take a political step which is not sanctioned by a President and his advisors or by many Members of Congress.

Only three years ago, in a conversation with an eminent senator I raised the question, and he indicated that, well, this idea was interesting after a ll it's perhaps pretty far out — to which I said: "What about the U.S. and Soviet proposals of 1962?" This man said, "What proposals?" You have to understand as one of the conditions of our time that the events of that recent past have been wiped out of public awareness, are not in the books of modern history, are typically not being taught in the courses in international relations, are not being given central attention in instruction in political science -- not in the U.S.A. However, it's my estimate that people would rather live than die. They would rather live with the prospect, economically, of a decent life and that there is a growing awareness that the arms' race is a no win proposition.

It's on the basis of a ll these estimates that I'm pleased to be able to report to you that one of the original drafters of the 1962 plan, Marcus Raskin, is now of the Institute of Policy Studies in Washington D.C. He and I are undertaking the redraft of that scheme for 1983 conditions. We will shortly put it in the hands of a team of people for independent criticism. We will make it available to the National Board of SANE. When they in their wisdom adopt that proposal, we will take that to the Congress of the United States and propose to members (who I think are ready for it) that that be made the subject of hearings before the Congress; that those hearings be conducted around the country so that the people everywhere and the press and the media learn once again that the idea of reversing the arms' race is a matter to be taken seriously and can be addressed in a serious way. We are committed to the proposition that the reversal of the arms' race will be made a political issue in the United States and that collateral with that, the proposal for legislation for planning conversion from a military to a civilian economy will be made a political issue. We will do everything we know how to do to invite candidates from political office to declare themselves on these two matters. We will indicate to them that we will use their commitment on these matters as the litmus test of support for their political office holding, regardless of all other conditions that they may be surrounded with, politically speaking. I believe that it is possible now to formulate a workable scheme, again over a ten year period, again proceeding by stages, again taking into

account the new conditions for inspection/verification that will rally the interest and attention of millions of Americans and lead them to support once again the idea of reversal of the arms' race as a workable proposition.

We will incorporate in this scheme plans for improving international institutions for peacekeeping, for resolution of international conflict. We will try to draw on the best brains that have been working on the matter to make imaginative formulations to build up that capability so that people will see that this is not a Buck Rogers scenario. Neither does this assume that all nations will cease their warring and their conflict generating character; and that neither do we assume that people will cease being aggressive individually or as national groups. Rather, we will assume that all these matters will continue, but we have to find new ways of institutionalizing the resolution of conflict, the resolution of the forces that give rise to aggression.

My judgement is that as a reversal of the arms' race begins, each step will constitute a change of the scene on which the next step is to be contemplated and carried out. In that sense the reversal of the arms' race will be understood as a cumulative process such that each event will change the scene against which the next event must take place. The successful performance of each event will give renewed confidence to take the next step. A ten year period, in my judgement, is necessary because therefore the slicing down will be in steps of approximately 10% per year, plus or minus .10% in almost anything will not make much of a military difference. So, playing on our side will be the conventional conservatism of the military planners who build and overbuild, who provide for safety factors, who try to provide for advantages by factor of five for offensive operations and the like. Carrying out a reversal will be able to draw on that conventional wisdom by putting it in the reverse. Further, our judgement is that unlike the proposals of 1962, we will make the idea of conversion from military to civilian economy and the requisite planning for it an integral part of the arms' race reversal process. That is to say, for a nation to participate in this reversal process it will be mandatory to carry out blueprinting and execution of economic conversion planning, since we regard that as an integral part of the arms' race reversal.

There is no science from which to make a prediction as to whether this prospective, whether this political effort will succeed. But I am delighted to be at this university and to issue an invitation to every single one of you to ask yourself the question: "What can I do to contribute in any way to the effective understanding of the problems involved in these important processes?"

Thank you.

QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION

I'll be very pleased to hear your queries and comments. I have no planes to catch tonight.

Well, George Orwell gave us the great clue to all this. He said that in the 1984 type society, war is peace and ignorance is strength. Those are the great mottos. Freedom is slavery. Now, I don't agree. War is not peace and the MX is not a peacekeeper and the ideas of deterrence are just great for confusing the intellectuals and the public. But there is a great divergence between the discussion of deterrence — for example along the lines that you very ably summarized and the way the military institutions train their people. I am an honorary member of the faculty of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces of the Defense University and in the course of this annual pilgrimage that I make to address the room full of senior officers, I've discovered that there's a topic that they are not even prepared to contemplate, let alone address seriously. That topic is limits of military power. They won't touch it. Of course, as soon as you open it up the underpinnings of their profession and their institutions just go up in smoke. Instead, they focus on winning, on superiority, on striking first as though the effects outlined by Handler didn't exist. I have never been able to get a response from these rooms full of Colonels, Generals and Commanders as to what is superiority, never mind how to get it. Just what is it today? They are able to give elaborate explication of what is winning and what is losing because you can draw that from the history of the United States through the Second World War in great detail. The war in Viet Nam is in their book a sort of an aberration where they didn't let us win. The idea that it might contain a lesson about limits of military power is a topic that they can't touch.

Now, the idea of deterrence is that you will frighten an opponent into immobility and the awkwardness is this: Country A and Country B each have of able people, just like us, each one. Each one calculates what is necessary to freeze the opponent into immobility. As the advisors on each side give their leaders the judgement that the other side is now deterred the military go for broke, hit him first, go to war types will then be able to judge -- Now is the time to hit them, when they are frozen! Now, there is no science from which to judge that the two sides will not unfreeze at the same time. The idea of deterrence is a psychological ploy. There is no predictive system associated with it whatever. There is not a single statement of cause-effect that has been formulated to elaborate the idea they have termed deterrence. Deterrence is a hope. It's a wish. It's not a predictive theory and I'm not prepared to stake the future of human community on that.

Q. INAUDIBLE

A. Commission of secret arms and secret arms production was a central problem of the study done 25 years ago. As a matter of fact, it was the topic that I looked after directly and the

way we examined that was by studying the technique of illegal military organizations in a series of places. How the Black Reich Sphere was formed in Weimar Germany, the functioning of the IRA, the functioning of the guerrillas in Malay, the function of the illegal Jewish armies under British rule in then Palestine, and from that we were able to formulate principles of success of the illegal military operation. They are straightforward. There are three principles. Having a team of people ready to risk their lives. Secondly, having the support of the surrounding population that will conceal them and third being able to operate such that an opponent, read here an international inspectorate is unable to tell the difference between the illegal operators and ordinary people. Under those three conditions it becomes possible to organize illegal military operations on a considerable scale. We tested that out in a way that really worried me at the time -- but I'm glad we did it. I set up three evasion teams, laid out conditions of an international inspectorate operation and commissioned them to formulate ways of evading it. Their results were very respectable in each case. In fact, they were so successful that I worried about the ethics of publishing the results. But I decided, since these people could do it, comparable people could do it as well, so there was nothing very special here. And I'm convinced of that to this day. We then proceeded to re-examine everything that we had done in way of inspection and we reached the following conclusion: To keep peace you see the support of the surrounding population. If that is sustained, you are in terrible trouble. If you can break the support of the surrounding population, you've got it made. It then becomes near impossible for anything of size to go on in an underground manner. We formulated the following device to address that. It's called, "Inspection by the People", and the scheme essentially is this. That it be stipulated as part of an international arms' race reversal agreement that the Chief of State of each participating government must instruct the population by obviously stateable means that it is henceforth a primary duty of citizenship and of law-abiding citizens not only to comply with this international agreement, but that it is a duty of citizenship to report violators of that agreement because violators endanger the whole community.

Well, you might say that might go very well in so called open societies but what about so called closed societies — so I thought it was very important that when Mr. Krushchev visited in the United States in 1961 — he was asked by reporters what he thought of this idea. He said he would support it. Now, the interesting thing is, that all these ideas have to be addressed. I think it is important that you raise the kind of question that you raised. But I say that the raising of that question does not foreclose a possible way of coping with it. What I find distressing is that many people judge that merely the

raising of that question constitutes the termination of the discussion. I don't think so at all. I think these problems can be addressed. They deserve to be addressed. At this moment I'm not even that optimistic. That is to say, I'm not prepared to judge that every kind of contingency can be coped with. I don't know that that is the case. I have no science with which to make such a forecast. I do have the firm estimate, however, that if the arms' race succeeds we are lost and therefore that if we are deserving at all of the status of thinking people that part of that ought to be an application of our talents to finding ways to forestall that consequence.

Q.

A. What is rock bottom of what I am talking about? I'm being stubborn about the idea that no one has a moral right to terminate the race. If you are a believer, you are undoing God's work. If you are not a believer you are undoing this magnificent outcome of natural selection. I grant no one the moral right to undo it. That's my rock bottom position.

Q.

A. It's been said over and over again that the freeze will be the first step. First of all, on logical grounds, I don't think anything is the first step unless you know the second or third or fourth; and second you don't know if it's a first step unless it is somehow linked to what is supposed to be the second, third or fourth. There has yet been no declared linkage and no diagnosis of linkage from freeze to subsequent steps. The fact is that the idea of freeze was formulated at another time and had another meaning. It was formulated for example in the explication of the U.S. 1962 plan, when Arthur Dean wrote: "The ideas that the nations of the world should seize a moment in time to stop the arms' race, to freeze the military situation as it then appears and to shrink it to zero like a balloon, instead of permitting more and more air to be blown into the balloon until it bursts." That appears in this text called Toward a World Without War, the U.S. government's explication. But this idea of a freeze appeared as the clearly introductory move in what was to be an agreed process of detailed reversal of arms' race. So, in that context something was clearly a first step because the subsequent steps were all defined, agreed and committed. Now, we've had other experience with things that were called first steps. That was in the Test Ban Treaty in 1963. That was called a first step and my colleagues and I who were in the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy at that time played a part in propagating the idea that willy nilly, this was a first step. We

wanted it to be a first step, that's for sure. It never was. Why wasn't it? We have to learn from that experience or we'll be played for patsies again. President Kennedy, in order to get the support, so he said, of conservative senators and the joint Chiefs of Staff, promised that if they voted for this partial Test Ban (Atmospheric Testing) that he would ensure that not only would there be more funds for the military generally, but there would be more funds, more material, more laboratories and more nuclear testing than ever before. He delivered on every one of those« and there was more nuclear testing than ever before. The development of nuclear weapons proceeded at an accelerating rate. So, the Test Ban was not a first step. Was it a good thing to have? Of course it was. Of course it yielded a cleaner atmosphere. Of course the milk became somewhat less contaminated. But it was not a first step. What about the freeze? I've made some estimates of what the political calendar would be like if one were to undertake under most optimistic conditions the program of freeze. Here's what I find.

Suppose there are no major flaws, no holdbacks, no delays, political win on every count and at every stage. The freeze idea sweeps the country, more than now and the next administration coming into office in Washington is committed to that proposition. Let's assume it's a President like Hatfield or Kennedy, who detailed the original proponents of the Kennedy-Hatfield freeze resolution. That would put us in January, 1985. The new administration names a staff. Give them three months for that. The staff must formulate the text of a proposed international negotiating position. Give them three months for that. We are now at July, 1985. There must be a serious discussion in the country and the Congress to generate consensus around that negotiating position. Allow three months for that. Then, the Soviets are called to meet and negotiate. They need some time, even on the assumption that they've done homework parallel with the American government. So, negotiations begin in January, 1986 and a really complex series of matters have to be dealt with, for example, involving questions of verification or inspection of the freeze proposal. Why? Because the freeze is not a destruction of weaponry. It's a restriction on further production requiring not only access to and inspection of places of production but coping with problems like what is the difference between new weapons production and against spare parts production for an existing stock pile of weaponry. Nobody has yet formulated a way of coping with that kind of inspection problem, which would be the most difficult and intricate by far. In other words, how do you inspect a military production system which is in place and is inherently set up for secrecy, surprise, exclusion of outsiders, control of knowledge and the like? Allow a 6 month period for that negotiation and that it concludes successfully and that puts us into July of 1986. The proposition comes back to the U.S. Senate for ratification.- Allow 3 months for a senate debate. We are now in October, 1986. The Senate approves it. Implementation takes many moves with respect to industrial facilities. -- closing them down, relocating people — and time

must be allotted to that process. You can't just throw the switch and close the lock on the gate. An inspectorate must be recruited and put in place. I allow six months for that preparatory set of operations. Hence, implementation begins in April, 1987. What has happened between November, 1982 (that's when I wrote this piece) and April, 1987. The military budgets and as planned, continue. The productions of new material, escalation of U.S. division, rapid response forces and the like, new nuclear forces all continue. Cruise missiles are already being produced in multiples per day. So, the elapsed time between now and 1987 allows full scope for major escalation of the present arms' race. I am not prepared to wait until April, 1987 before raising the question of what's the next step! I want the program of steps formulated, discussed NOW and made an integral part of a succession of moves.

Q.

A. I agree with you, and you see my perspective is that you start from where we are now and go through a ten year process of de-escalation. So, obviously the implication is that after year 1, 90% of what is here now is going to be in place. However, there is something implied in your comment that I am not prepared to go with. I am not prepared to make a case for the positive functioning of what is called a deterrent strategy. I am not prepared to build confidence in the idea of deterrent-strategy, because I know of now grounds for doing that. Now, that is a very different matter from what I propose, which is, that we take the present condition of grave and growing danger and mitigate it. Now, if you choose through your taste and preference to call what I designate as this condition of present and growing danger — if you choose to designate that satisfactory deterrence, I don't mind. Follow your taste. But I am interested in the action of reversal. Now, if you want to call each of those actions of reversal improving our security, that's alright That's alright. That suits me. If you want to call it lessening deterrence well that is your judgement. You can't prove it. If you want to say that on Day 1 we'll have 40 times overkill but on Year 1 we'll only have 36 times overkill, having taken off 10%, O.K., I don't mind that statement being made. But I'm not ready to call 36 times overkill satisfactory deterrence as against 40 times overkill.

Q

A. Deliberate behaviour, 10% of the time. Now, you were raising another question there. You're saying that it's necessary to convince the defense establishment. There'll always be some

of them who are convinced. Especially the retired Generals and Admirals. You know why? They convince themselves. The minute they're out of office and aren't playing 'Watch Your Ass' anymore, and aren't playing for the next promotion and don't feel under the constant whip of having to show that they're on the team, why, some proportion of them obviously just turn around and start reciting a different kind of wisdom. They'll do it. But I think it's unreasonable, in fact, almost unnatural to expect people who have spent almost all of their adult lives in devoted implementation of a set of doctrines to stand up as of Day 1 and say: "I was wrong". I don't expect them to do that. I don't want to ask them to do that. I want to be able to say to them (and I've said it, I'm not contemplating a speculation) -- I've turned to these two hundred odd

...that is, how to classify the weaponry, how to carry out the reversal, how to handle the problem of inspection and verification. These are military problems. I think that you should be able as an institution to make contributions to coping with those military problems. If your commitment is to the military security of this country then why aren't you prepared to contemplate this contingency. You've got rooms full of file cabinets full of contingency plans for military situations. Fine. Add another file cabinet on another kind of military situation and that one is called reversing the arms' race and let's see your military judgement on the military problems involved in doing this. That's a serious matter and I want the participation of people in the military. I want to convince them of the importance of their participation and its usefulness. But I'm not ready to wait for it. Because to wait for it is tantamount to asking them today to turn around and bite the hand (Ronald Reagan) that's feeding them and I think that is unreasonable to expect. The truth of the matter is that in past appearances at Defense University and seminars of the Air Force, invariably there are these people who quietly at the end of the session mosey around and thank me for the remarks and how important it was to state this view and so on and so on.... In other words, there is a feeling of some number of these men (and I'll risk the estimate that they are among the thoughtful ones) that the ideas, some of them that I was formulating here, are regarded by them as serious and important and worthy of attention. Not that they agreed with them all -- and I didn't ask them. But that the act of so indicating is seen by them as an institutionally aberrant act and it is while they are in uniform and functioning as part of the establishment. I think that is inevitable. In our effort to get military clearance on important aspects of this plan for reversal of arms' race we'll call in ex-Generals, ex-Admirals, ex-Colonels under joint Chiefs, etc. and will be content with their appraisal. To be sure, the moment we are ready to put this out I won't hesitate in the slightest at showing up at that Industrial College of the Armed Forces with a bundle of these things given out down the aisles. I've done things like that and say: "Alright, apply your wits to this and apply your talents. I'd be delighted to hear your professional judgement on this matter."

Q

A. Because there is no theory from which to postulate that the freeze will automatically be followed by anything. There is not a movement. The freeze movement has no formulated second step, I'm sorry to say. The directorate of the freeze has been resistant to proposals for clearly formulated second steps. The officers of SANE and the staff of SANE have participated in the councils of the freeze movement and have proposed that there be second steps like starting to address the economic conversion idea and the like. But the officials of the freeze movement have been reluctant to introduce other ideas. I believe that that is at high risk, that is to say, their risk is that if and when the freeze resolution passes the Congress, the very next day there will be a feeling of depression, despair and disillusion among endless people who have worked so hard for it because they will suddenly feel empty handed. Now what do we do? What perspective do we have? Therefore, my judgement is that we have to formulate a general perspective in which the idea of freeze, obviously, is the first step. You stop production. You freeze. But then there are the next, next, next, next succession of steps. That's the way to operate. I will not be a party to any movement that proposes freeze or test ban or no first use or anything like that with the accompanying statement that it will serve as a first step. There's no warrant for it in political experience and I'm not ready to repeat the grave errors that were made in 1963.

Q.

A. Examine the press and related data from 1961 and 1962 and you will find that he did. What happened is that with the Cuban Missile Crisis this whole direction of initiative was wiped out.

Q.

A. My colleague, Marcus Raskin has written to him and he hasn't told me of any response just yet.

Q.

A. Actually, we're on to it, you know. We're trying not to miss a trick and even going to John McCloy who is now on in years and we don't know if he's functional or not and so on, but we're trying.

Q.

A. You're right.....my countrymen. It's a matter of known notoriety. About a third of the population is unmitigated hawk. An important part of the voting public declined to participate in the election, not being able to perceive a meaningful difference. Quite a number of our sort of people (if I may use that phrase) also declined to vote on the grounds that there was no difference. Quite a number of industrial workers, smitten by nationalist ideology and beset with the middle class wisdom that they were sponsoring a welfare class of idlers with their labour saw Mr. Reagan as a rescue operation of that debility. Now, once in office Reagan had to confront real issues and if Reagan now says or implies that you don't have to have nuclear superiority before negotiating then someone has succeeded in whispering the word to him that "We don't know how to do it fellas," and that is the real truth. Secondly, he is driven by conditions of economy and by a democratic Congress in the House to be limited in his military budget, so that the Democratic budget is an increase in military spending, but not the scale of increase that he desired. Furthermore, there are some number of bankers who have just gotten plain nervous on a financial level about what sustained deficits might mean. So, in response to all these pressures Ronald Reagan has turned to Buck Rogers and American scientists as the representation of that to, for god's said, come up with something. Notice the ingenious way that was put. It's a 20 year project. In other words, you can't expect anything next year, that is, nothing before the next election. In other words, no promises were made that anyone can point to as saying it's not fulfilled -- because none has been made. Now, there's a further factor involved in the U.S. case and I don't know of anyone who knows how to judge it's comparative importance. My estimate is that it is quite important and here it is. In the United States there is, in addition to other systems of theology, a state religion. In the state religion, the national state is god, the flag is the idol, the President is the high priest, the principle military officers are the acolytes and you see the worship of the idol among the endless Americans who raise the flag on the lawn every morning and who proudly display it year round, notably on days of national celebration. Now, that is a system of religion known and identified in the literature as idolatry. The beginning of that literature in modern times is in the Bible and the characteristics of idolatry include the idea that the idol worshippers identify themselves with the idol, such that the strength and

the weakness of the idol is their strength and their weakness. What the idol worshippers in the United States saw during the Carter administration is the weakening of the idol and therefore the weakening of the god state and the insufficiency of the High Priest. To them, it was therefore a matter of imperative importance that the High Priest be replaced by one who was once again committed to, fully, and without reservation to the strength of the idol, and hence, to their strength. That's Ronald Reagan. I think that's why the idol worshippers voted for him.take away in the slightest from the work of the Billy Graham's in the world and try to supplant a moral exhortation. Let it go on. Do suggest that a reversal of the arms' race process, by carrying out a visible reality of diminishing a stock of weapons will buy that demonstration, now as readily seen with high visibility on the TV tube around the world simultaneously, will yield a lesson that people will judge as an act justifying more confidence in the further conduct of this process. You see, these acts of reversal are by way of contravening a conventional wisdom proposition, namely, that more arms give us greater strength, thus greater security. The crucial assumption, (really it's another one of the assumptions underlying the idea of reversal of the arms' race) is the improvement of security in our time comes as we find ways of having fewer weapons and not more of them. I think that lesson will be learned as people see the act.

Q.

A. I'll know a little more about that the end of May. There's going to be a sort of East-West conference group meeting in Minneapolis and we expect Georgi Abotov and a bunch of academicians and Soviet officials to come around for massive private discussions and you can bet your life that while Marcus Raskin, who is the convener of those meetings and I are there, these issues that we have discussed tonight are going to be squarely on the table and we will know something about the reactions of some of those Russians to this. Further, I think it's worth noting that on all available evidence splits in the Soviet establishment among Soviet intellectuals are very much like our own. The differences of opinion really parallel the differences of opinion that one has heard voiced in this room. I find that comfortable. That is, it's familiar — familiar in that we know something about it. The differences between their society and ours are well known to all and don't need elaboration. My own experience with Soviet academics, intellectuals, government people has included the following: Long ago, in 1959, I visited at the Academy of Science with Topchev who was then the Secretary

and he brought a bunch of his colleagues and I went there with a proposal. I said, "Look, we've put out this book, "Inspection for Disarmament". Why don't you publish it in the U.S.S.R.? Translate it and publish it. I made a further offer. I said, "If you want to comment, however you wish, on any aspect of this book, you just do it — just so as on the printed page you differentiate your comment from the original text." I thought that was a fair offer. I didn't ask for a rebuttal or anything. What ensued for the next hour and a half or so was music to my ears because there right before me was a split and a debate between hawks and doves. Right there. I thought that was great. It gave me the kind of confidence that I was talking about a moment ago. The same thing happened when in 1961. I organized a conference on disarmament and the papers were to be published by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and they were, in a volume called Disarmament: It's Politics and Economics (that's one of the last books, you'll notice -- 1962 -- in the U.S. of its sort). In publishing that volume it was decided that we ought to try to get something that talked about divisions on reversing the arms' race in the U.S.S.R. So, I found what was supposed to be a very knowledgeable Soviet affairs specialist at MIT and I went to him with this project and we didn't get anywhere because he said: "Look, it may be as you say, but there are simply no data. There's nothing to write about. We don't have any serious evidence." A few months went by and the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party in the U.S.S.R convened. I called him up again. He said, "I'm sorry. The whole thing has changed. We got a ll the evidence now. I'll write the article." Why? What happened? "Well, right there on the pages of Pravda were the full text renditions of the debate in that Congress and there they were, the hawks and the doves battling it out right out in the open right on the floor and the whole thing was there for a ll to see." So, that essay you will find in a book (I'm sure it's in the libraries). It's Seymour Melman, Ed. and the title is Disarmament: It's Politics and Economics and it has a bunch of essays and included is that particular paper (you can't miss it - there's only one like it) and it talks about internal division on disarmament in the U.S.S.R. It is in my judgement a very important paper of its sort and I think it would be an immense contribution if scholars of Soviet society would address themselves to the material subsequent to that, to discover appropriate evidence that might illuminate this matter for us right to the present day.

I'm very pleased to be able to be with you. Thank you.